The theory of auctions and competitive bidding suggests that, under certain conditions, seemingly different auction mechanisms result in the same expected cost or revenue to the bid-taker.
Under such conditions, the differences in how bidders bid in response to different pricing rules offsets the differences in the rules themselves.
The extent to which such a theory predicts what actually happens in the real world depends on how well the theory models the essence of actual situations, and on how sensitive the theory is to its assumptions.
The literature has already established two of the assumptions -that of risk, neutrality and that of independent signals -to be pivotal. This paper examines a third assumption.
In particular, we allow each bidder to be faced by more than two possible outcomes; for example, a bidder may be allowed to win any subset of the objects offered for sale. Then, for risk neutral bidders with independent private values (for each possible outcome), the expected revenue or cost to the bid-taker at equilibrium depends only on 1) the number of bidders, 2) the distribution of each bidder's values, 3 
